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THE DECLINING "SANCTITY" OF
WRITTEN CONTRACTS-IMPACT
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE ON THE PAROL EVIDENCE
RULE*
GEORGE I. WALLACH**
The parol evidence rule has been expressed in numerous ways during
its long and tortured history. A working definition of the rule is: When
the parties to an agreement have reduced their agreement to a writing in-
tended by them, or treated by the court, as a final and complete statement
of the entire agreement, the writing may not be contradicted, varied, or
even supplemented by prior oral or written understandings of the parties.
If the parties intended, or the court believes, that the writing was to be
merely a final expression of some of the terms of the agreement, the
writing may be supplemented but not varied or contradicted by prior oral
and written understandings of the parties.'
The term "parol evidence rule" is something of a misnomer for it does
not deal exclusively with parol, is not a rule of evidence, and at least in the
minds of some, is not even a rule. Although the rule does not deal ex-
clusively with parol, or oral agreements, the vast majority of the decided
cases involve attempts to introduce oral terms. In addition, the rule also
excludes prior written agreements and would do so under any of the dif-
ferent expressions of the parol evidence rule which will be discussed later in
this article.
Those who question whether the parol evidence rule is really a rule at
all seem to feel that certainty of definition and application are required
before something can be labeled a "rule," and the parol evidence rule
tends to lack both. The parol evidence rule has been defined in a number
* This article is based on material prepared for a treatise on the law of sales and
contracts under the Uniform Commercial Code to be published by Warren,
Gorham & Lamont, Inc. in 1980.
** Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia; B.S., City College of New
York, 1964; J.D., SUNY-Buffalo, 1967.
The author acknowledges the research assistance of David E. Woods, Class of
1980, in the preparation of this article.
1. For other expressions of the parol evidence rule, see 3 A. CORBIN, CON-
TRACTS § 573 (rev. ed. 1960);J. MURRAY, CONTRACTS § 105 (2d rev. ed. 1974); 9
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2425 (3d ed. 1940); 4 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 631
(3d ed. W. Jaeger 1961); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 239 (1973);
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 237, 240 (1932).
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of different ways, and different definitions have been used even within a
single jurisdiction when parol evidence questions have arisen. 2
There does seem to be unanimous agreement that the parol evidence
rule is not a rule of evidence but is a rule of substantive law.3 While a rule of
evidence is concerned with the proper method of proving a question of
fact, the parol evidence rule is not concerned with whether the evidence
has been properly introduced and admitted. Instead, it absolutely pro-
hibits the admission of certain evidence as "legally ineffective"4 even if the
offered evidence, which again usually takes the form of prior oral
agreements not repeated in the written contract, are otherwise admissible.
The parol evidence rule "defines the limits of a contract" by declaring
what may be considered in finding the contract between the parties. The
rule is thus exclusionary and prevents the admission of certain kinds of ex-
trinsic evidence at trial in order to prove what the agreement of the parties
was. When the writing is treated as representing the final expression of the
2. Zell v. American Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641, 649 (2d Cir. 1943), rev'd,
322 U.S. 709 (1944) ("[A] rule so leaky cannot fairly be described as a stout con-
tainer of legal certainty."); 3 A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 575 (rev. ed. 1960);
Broude, The Consumer and the Parol Evidence Rule: Section 2-202 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 1970 DUKE L.J. 881, 884 ("[E]ven these leading
academic commentators cannot agree about what the rule is, what it purports to
exclude, and what evidence may be admitted despite its restrictions."); Sweet,
Contract Making and Parol Evidence: Diagnosis and Treatment of a Sick Rule,
53 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1045-46 (1968).
3. Centronics Fin. Corp. v. El Conquistador Hotel Corp., 573 F.2d 779 (2d
Cir. 1978); Associated Hardware Supply Co. v. Big Wheel Distrib. Co., 355 F.2d
114 (3d Cir. 1966); Long v. Morris, 128 F.2d 653, 141 A.L.R. 1041 (3d Cir.
1942); Matthews v. Drew Chem. Corp., 475 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1973); Hoffman v.
Late, 222 Ark. 395, 260 S.W.2d 446 (1953); Shivers v. Liberty Bldg. Loan Ass'n,
16 Cal. 2d 296, 106 P.2d 4 (1940); Estate of Gaines, 15 Cal. 2d 255, 100 P.2d 1055
(1940); Childers & Venters, Inc. v. Sowards, 460 S.W.2d 343 (Ky. 1970);Johnson
v. Johnson, 297 Ky. 268, 178 S.W.2d 983 (1944); Rinaudo v. Bloom, 209 Md. 1,
120 A.2d 184 (1956); Warinner v. Nugent, 362 Mo. 233, 240 S.W.2d 941 (1951);
Golden Gate Corp. v. Barrington College, 98 R.I. 35, 199 A.2d 586 (1964);
Quinn v. Bernat, 80 R.I. 375, 97 A.2d 273 (1953); 9J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
2400 (3d ed. 1940).
4. 9J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2400 (3d ed. 1960). RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS § 237 (1932) ("[T]he integration of an agreement makes inoperative...
all contemporaneous oral agreements ... and . .. all prior oral or written
agreements . . ... "). See also Calamari & Perillo, A Plea for a Uniform Parol
Evidence Rule and Principles of Contract Interpretation, 42 IND. L.J. 333, 334
(1967) ("[P]rior understandings are irrelevant to the process of determining the
content of the final contract.").
5. Hoffman v. Late, 222 Ark. 395, 260 S.W.2d 446 (1953); Shivers v.
Liberty Bldg. Loan Ass'n, 16 Cal. 2d 296, 106 P.2d 4 (1940); Estate of Gaines, 15
Cal. 2d 255, 100 P.2d 1055 (1940); Childers & Venters, Inc. v. Sowards, 460
S.W.2d 343 (Ky. 1970). See also Warinner v. Nugent, 362 Mo. 233, 238, 240
S.W.2d 941, 944 (1951) (The parol evidence rule "fixes the subject matter for in-
terpretation, though not itself a rule of interpretation."); 9 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2400 (3d ed. 1940).
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agreement between the parties, it is deemed to be the contract as a matter
of substantive law. The parol evidence rule assumes that earlier
agreements not expressed in the written contract have been abandoned by
the parties at some point in their negotiations leading up to this final writ-
ten agreement.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
A. Policies Behind the Rule
The parol evidence rule exists for many of the same policy reasons that
are used to justify the existence of the statute of frauds. Written contracts
have long enjoyed a preferred status in the law over oral contracts as a
result of their tendency to be more accurate and detailed. Accurate and
detailed contracts eliminate much of the risk of perjured testimony con-
cerning the existence and terms of an agreement6 and the risk of fading
memories . 7
While the statute of frauds encourages the use of written contracts by
preventing the enforcement of certain oral agreements, the parol evidence
rule encourages the use of written contracts by insulating the written con-
tract from extrinsic sources of contract terms - and occasionally even from
extrinsic sources of interpretation of contract terms. The parol evidence
rule, then, sanctifies the writing at the expense of the parties8 by excluding
other forms of evidence from the jury's consideration when they determine
the agreement of the parties. Since the parol evidence rule is a rule applied
by the trial judge, evidence which violates the rule never reaches the jury.
When the trial judge decides to exclude this evidence, he does so either to
protect the writing, or to exclude evidence- which he does not believe to be
credible from the reach of the jury.9
Authorities are divided on the principal justification for the parol
evidence rule, assuming that one purpose for the rule's existence has to be
6. Kupka v. Morey, 541 P.2d 740 (Alas. 1975); Mitchill v. Lath, 247 N.Y.
377, 160 N.E. 646 (1928); 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 575 (rev. ed. 1960).
7. Professor McCormick offers the following quote from an English case
decided in 1604- "uncertain testimony of slippery memory" - in offering this as
one of the justifications for the parol evidence rule. McCormick, The Parol
Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for the Control of the Jury, 41 YALE L.J.
365, 367 n.3 (1932).
8. Zell v. American Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1943), rev'd, 322
U.S. 709 (1944); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-9 (1972).
9. It has sometimes been suggested that the principal, if not the sole,
justification for the parol evidence rule is as a jury control device. Zell v. Ameri-
can Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1943), rev'd, 322 U.S. 709 (1944); Moffitt
v. Maness, 102 N.C. 457, 9 S.E. 399 (1889); McCormick, The Parol Evidence
Rule as a Procedural Device for Control of the Jury, 41 YALE LJ. 365 (1932).
1979]
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given priority over other possible purposes. The parol evidence rule,
however, serves at least the following functions: it promotes the use of,
and protects, written agreements; and it gives the trial judge a polite
means of keeping suspect oral evidence from the jury.
B. Traditional Situations to Which the Rule Does Not Apply
The parol evidence rule traditionally has been applied only to
evidence that affects the terms of a written contract which is being enforc-
ed. For this reason, the parol evidence rule has been held to be inap-
plicable where a party is seeking to avoid the contract, as where fraud, il-
legality, duress, failure of consideration or mistake are raised as defenses to
the contract's enforcement.10
Conditions precedent which have not been satisfied can also be shown
by parol evidence on the theory that they do not affect the terms of the con-
tract to be enforced, but rather prevent the contract's enforcement." This
exception to the parol evidence rule is difficult to justify. Fraud, illegality
and similar defenses can be raised without conceptual difficulty since these
defenses do not turn on contract terms, but rather on other circumstances
which have nothing to do with the terms of the agreement itself. Condi-
tions precedent, however, are a type of contract term and arguably should
be subject to some type of restriction on admissibility if not found in the
written agreement. For this reason, this exception has not been universally
recognized.' 2 In addition, many courts will not admit evidence of a condi-
tion precedent if there is anything in the contract which suggests that such
a condition does not exist. The suggestion can come either from the
language of the contract or from the fact that the contract lists certain con-
10. Centronics Fin. Corp. v. El Conquistador Hotel Corp., 573 F.2d 779 (2d
Cir. 1978); Bell v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 575 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1978); Cone Mills
Corp. v. A. G. Estes, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 938 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Ed Find Olds-
mobile, Inc. v. Knisley, 319 A.2d 33 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974); City Dodge, Inc. v.
Gardner, 232 Ga. 766, 208 S.E.2d 794 (1974); Jerry Alderman Ford Sales, Inc. v.
Bailey, 291 N.E.2d 92 (Ind. App. 1972); Childers & Venters, Inc. v. Sowards, 460
S.W.2d 343 (Ky. 1970); Millerton Agway Coop., Inc. v. Briarcliff Farms, Inc., 17
N.Y.2d 57, 267 N.Y.S.2d 18, 215 N.E.2d 341 (1966); Allen-Parker Co. v. Lollis,
257 S.C. 266, 185 S.E.2d 739 (1971); Coleman v. Continental Cattle Co., 488
S.W.2d 492 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974).
See generally 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 580 (rev. ed. 1960); J. MURRAY, CON-
TRACTS § 109 (2d rev. ed. 1974); 4 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 634 (3d ed. W.
Jaeger 1961); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 240(d) (1973);
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 238 (1932); Sweet, Contract Making and Parol
Evidence: Diagnosis and Treatment of a Sick Rule, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 1036,
1039 (1968).
11. 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 589 (rev. ed. 1960); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 243 (1973); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1932).
12. The condition precedent exception is not, for example, recognized in
the state of Georgia. Deck House, Inc. v. Scarborough, Sheffield & Gaston, Inc.,
139 Ga. App. 173, 228 S.E.2d 142 (1976).
[Vol. 44
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ditions other than the one a party is attempting to establish by parol
evidence. As one court expressed it:
While generally an integrated written agreement may be shown
not to have taken effect because of an oral condition precedent,
this being an exception to the parol evidence rule, the exception
does not apply where the oral condition precedent would con-
tradict the express terms of the writing.1
3
C. Total versus Partial Integration
The overriding issue in parol evidence disputes is whether the parties
intended the written document to be a final and complete statement of
their agreement, or a final statement of a part of their agreement, or
perhaps nothing more than a memorandum not intended to be a final ex-
pression of their agreement at all. The court decides this issue of intent
before the rule prevents the admission of extrinsic evidence. A writing is
labeled a totally integrated contract when the parties to the agreement
have adopted the writing as "the final and complete expression of the
agreement." A totally integrated contract is the sole source of the agree-
ment between the parties. In contrast, a writing may be considered only
partially integrated if the court finds that the parties intended the writing
to be the final and complete expression of only the terms actually contain-
ed in the writing. A partially integrated contract can be supplemented by
at least some types of prior oral or written terms.
The parol evidence rule itself does not provide a guide by which the
judge is to determine the related issues of total integration and partial in-
tegration. Ordinarily, it might be expected that this intent of the parties to
integrate the agreement would be determined in the same way intent is
ascertained in other situations, namely, by examination of all relevant
evidence that would shed some light on the actual or probable intent of the
parties. When the parol evidence rule is involved, however, the question of
intent has not been pursued along these lines. Rather than looking for in-
tent, courts generally have established artifical tests to determine if the
parties intended to create an integrated agreement. These tests do not
necessarily lead to the discovery of the actual intent the parties may have
had at the time of contracting.
Three pre-Code tests for total integration are widely recognized, none
of which are statutory in origin. 14 The Uniform Commercial Code's parol
13. Whirlpool Corp. v. Regis Leasing Corp., 29 App. Div. 2d 395, 397, 288
N.Y.S.2d 337, 339 (1968). See also Antonellis v. Northgate Constr. Corp., 362
Mass. 847, 291 N.E.2d 626 (1973); 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 589 (rev. ed.
1960);'4 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 634 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1961); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 243, comment b (1973); RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 241 (1932); Comment, The "Merger Clause" and the Parol
Evidence Rule, 27 TEX. L. REV. 361, 371 (1949).
14. The Uniform Commercial Code's parol evidence rule has been described
as the first statutory codification of the rule. Broude, The Consumer and the
6551979]
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evidence rule, and its tests for total and partial integration, can be better
understood by beginning with an examination of these pre-Code inter-
pretations of the rule.
II, PRE-CODE APPROACHES TO THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
A. The "Four Corners" Doctrine
1. Presumption of Finality
The "four corners" doctrine was one of the earliest expressions of the
parol evidence rule and today is largely of historical interest.15 Under this
approach, courts used a two-step test to determine whether a writing was
the final and exclusive agreement of the parties. The first step was to deter-
mine whether the writing appeared to be a complete agreement simply by
looking at the face of the writing. The second step, after an affirmative
decision upon the first, was to presume that the writing was the final and
complete expression of the parties' agreement.
Thompson v. Libbey16 exemplifies the "four corners" approach to the
parol evidence rule. That case dealt with the following agreement: "I
have this day sold to R. C. Libbey, of Hastings, Minn., all of my logs mark-
ed 'H.C.A.,' cut in the winters of 1882 and 1883, for ten dollars a thousand
feet, boom scale at Minneapolis, Minnesota. Payment, cash, as fast as
scale bills are produced. "117 The writing was dated and signed by both par-
ties. When the plaintiff sued for the purchase price, the defendant raised a
breach of warranty defense based on an oral promise allegedly made at the
time of the sale.
Applying the "four corners" doctrine, the court stated that the sole test
for integration, or whether the parties had intended to express their whole
agreement in the writing, was whether the writing contained "such
Parol Evidence Rule: Section 2-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1970
DUKE L.J. 881, 882. It would be more accurate to say that it is the first widely
adopted and uniform codification, since a number of states do have statutory
parol evidence rules other than the one found in the Uniform Commercial Code.
See, e.g., Mueller v. Hubbard Milling Co., 573 F.2d 1029 (8th Cir. 1978).
15. J. MURRAY, CONTRACTS § 106 (2d rev. ed. 1974) ("[N]o modem court
should be guided by such a restrictive test."). The "four comers" approach has
been rejected by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 236, comment b
(1973); U.C.C. § 2-202, comment l(a). Thompson v. Libbey, 34 Minn. 374, 26
N.W. 1 (1885), the leading case employing the "four comers" approach, has been
rejected as "no longer authoritative." Nysingh v. Warren, 94 Idaho 384, 385 n.2,
488 P.2d 355, 356 n.2 (1971).
16. 34 Minn. 374, 26 N.W. 1 (1885). Other significant opinions adopting
this approach to the parol evidence rule include: Johnson v. Johnson, 297 Ky.
268, 178 S.W.2d 983 (1944); Anchor Cas. Co. v. Bird Island Produce, Inc., 249
Minn. 137, 82 N.W.2d 48 (1957).
17. 34 Minn. at 375, 26 N.W. at 2.
[Vol. 44656
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language as imports a complete legal obligation." The court held that the
writing was the whole agreement because nothing on the writing's face in-
dicated that it was informal or incomplete. After finding that the writing
was complete on its face, the court presumed that the parties had put
"every material item and term" into it.
The rule established in Thompson, that a written agreement ap-
parently complete on its face is conclusively presumed to be the final and
complete expression of the agreement of the parties, is highly artificial. It
presupposes that the parties intended the writing to include all of the terms
of the agreement, a supposition which may be far from the parties' actual
intent. The justification for the rule in Thompson appears to be founded
on a significant moral overtone: parties to a contract should put their en-
tire agreement in writing. The "four corners" doctrine, more than any
later expression of the parol evidence rule, was at least in part influenced
by this belief. Parties who sought to introduce extrinsic sources of contract
terms were not treated sympathetically, especially when the written con-
tract looked complete to the judge. If the parties were going to put their
contract in.a writing which looked complete, they were going to have to
put all of it in writing or bear the consequences of having failed to do so.
The "four corners" doctrine did not exclude extrinsic evidence when
the court found the writing to be incomplete on its face. The Thompson
court noted "bills of parcels and the like" as examples of incomplete
writings which were not integrated. However, when the writing appeared
to be facially complete, it was almost impossible to demonstrate that the
writing was only a partially integrated agreement. Without evidence of ac-
cident, mistake or fraud, the courts held that the "four corners" doctrine
would not allow a party to prove that the writing was incomplete or only
partially integrated.18
2. Decline Under the "Collateral Contract" Concept
On first impression, the "four corners" doctrine would seem to be a
total bar to attempts to establish oral agreements between the parties when
the writing appeared to be a complete contract. Yet a written contract
would not necessarily be the only agreement ever entered into between the
two parties. For example, if a consumer had signed a contract to buy a new
car from a car dealer for $8,000, this written contract would not prevent
the enforcement of an oral agreement to buy a used truck for $3,000
entered into a week earlier. The earlier agreement would be enforceable in
spite of the parol evidence rule because it was an entirely separate or col-
lateral agreement.
The parol evidence rule does not require all agreements between two
parties to be in writing. It only applies to a single contract where all or part
18. The cases are collected in 4 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 633 (3d ed.
W. Jaeger 1961). 7
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of that contract has been reduced to writing. The unwritten agreement
can appear to be completely independent of the written contract. When
the subject matter of the unwritten contract is completely different from
that of the written contract, the consideration for each separate, and the
agreements entered into at different times, it is easy to see this in-
dependence.
The truly independent agreements are at one end of the spectrum. At
the other end are truly interrelated agreements where there is, in
substance, only one contract between the parties. In the example given
above, could the consumer offer to prove that the car dealer had agreed to
install an air conditioner in the car at no additional cost, even though the
contract was silent with respect to this obligation? The buyer's argument
would be that this agreement was sufficently independent of the agree-
ment to purchase the car so that it ought to be admissible.
Agreements that are ostensibly independent of the basic agreement il-
lustrate the basis for the "collateral contract" concept. Returning to the
example above, if the additional agreement was quasi-independent, or
"collateral" to the main agreement, it is arguable that the written agree-
ment was not intended to deal with this "collateral" agreement.
The "collateral contract" concept was developed to avoid the harsh
result reached by the "four corners" doctrine where the written contract
was facially complete. 19 The "four corners" rule had no response ready for
this "collateral contract" argument. This failing, combined with the total
artificiality of the rule, led to its decline in popularity. Recent opinions
rarely use this test when confronted with a total integration situation.
The "four corners" doctrine was largely displaced by a second test
developed for determining the parties' intent to create a complete and
final written contract; a test which at least in part was designed to deal
more effectively with the "collateral contract" argument. This test, often
referred to as'the "naturally and normally" or "reasonable man" test, was
promoted by Professor Williston 20 and adopted by the original Restate-
ment of Contracts.21
19. McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for The
Control of the Jury, 41 YALE L.J. 365, 371 (1932). See also Markoffv. Kreiner,
180 Md. 150, 154, 23 A.2d 19, 23 (1941); Buyken v. Ertner, 33 Wash. 2d 334,
339-42, 205 P.2d 628, 633-636 (1949).
20. 4 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, §§ 638-639 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1961).
21. The Restatement of Contracts expresses the rule in the following
language:
§ 240. In What Cases Integration Does Not Affect Prior or Contem-
poraneous Agreements.
(1) An oral agreement is not superseded or invalidated by a subsequent
or a contemporaneous integration, nor a written agreement by a
subsequent integration relating to the same subject-matter, if the
agreement is not inconsistent with the integrated contract, and
(a) is made for separate consideration, or
(b) is such an agreement as might naturally be made as a separate
658 [Vol. 44
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B. The "Reasonable Man" Standard
Professor Williston's "reasonable man" approach resembles the "four
corners" approach in two ways. First, the test involves several steps. Se-
cond, the test concentrates on the appearance of the written contract. 22
One of the leading decisions following the "reasonable man" approach is
Mitchill v. Lath,23 where the court did not admit an alleged oral agree-
ment under the parol evidence rule. In that case the plaintiff wanted to
purchase a piece of land located adjacent to another parcel of land owned
by the same seller and upon which sat an icehouse. After buying the land,
the purchaser sued for breach of contract when the seller did not remove
the icehouse. She alleged that the defendants had orally agreed to remove
the icehouse. Unfortunately, no provision requiring that the icehouse be
removed was in the written contract that the parties had signed.
agreement by parties situated as were the parties to the written
contract.(2) Where no consideration is stated in an integration, facts showing
that there was consideration and the nature of it, even if it was a
promise, or any other facts that are sufficient to make a promise en-
forceable, are admissible in evidence and are operative.
22. The principal distinction between the two approaches is that Professor
Williston had an answer for the proponent of the collateral contract argument.
His approach to the question of the parties' intent to produce an integrated
writing has been summarized as follows:
(1) If the writing expressly declares that it contains the entire agree-
ment of the parties (what is sometimes referred to as a merger clause),
the declaration conclusively establishes that the integration is total unless
the document is obviously incomplete or the merger clause was included
as a result of fraud or mistake or any reason exists that is sufficient to set
aside a contract. As previously indicated, even a merger clause does not
prevent enforcement of a separate agreement supported by a distinct
consideration.
(2) In the absence of a merger clause, the determination is made by
looking to the writing. Consistent additional terms may be proved if the
writing is obviously incomplete on its face or if it is apparently complete
but, as in the case of deeds, bonds, bills, and notes, expresses the under-
taking of only one of the parties.
(3) Where the writing appears to be a complete instrument express-
ing the rights and obligations of both parties, it is deemed a total integra-
tion unless the alleged additional terms were such as might naturally be
made as a separate agreement by parties situated as were the parties to
the written contract.
Calamari & Perillo, A Plea for a Uniform Parol Evidence Rule and Principles of
Contract Interpretation, 42 IND. LJ. 333, 338 (1967).
23. 247 N.Y. 347, 160 N.E. 646 (1928). See also Seitz v. Brewers' Refrig.
Mach. Co., 141 U.S. 510, 517 (1891); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Shapiro, 270 Ala.
149, 117 So. 2d 348 (1960); Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal. 2d 222, 436 P.2d 561, 65
Cal. Rptr. 545 (1968); Caputo v. Continental Constr. Corp., 340 Mass. 15, 162
N.E.2d 813 (1959); Gianni v. R. Russel Co., 281 Pa. 320, 126 A. 791 (1924);
Golden Gate Corp. v. Barrington College, 98 R.I. 35, 199 A.2d 586 (1964);
Danielson v. Bank of Scandinavia, 201 Wis. 392, 230 N.W. 83 (1930).
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The court stated that three requirements must be met before an alleg-
ed oral agreement would be admitted to vary a written agreement: (1) the
agreement must be collateral; (2) it must not contradict express or implied
provisions of the writing; and (3) it must be one "that the parties would not
ordinarily be expected to embody in the writing," or not "be so clearly con-
nected with the principal transaction as to be part and parcel of it."24
The court rejected plaintiff's evidence of the alleged oral agreement
and found that although the alleged oral agreement was collateral, it was
too "closely related to the subject dealt with in the written agreement."
Therefore plaintiff did not satisfy the third requirement for admission of
the parol evidence. The court seemed initially to follow the "four corners"
rule as a basis for its conclusion that the writing provided for a full and
complete agreement which detailed the obligations of both parties. The
test applied, however, was not whether the writing was complete on its
face, but rather was an extension of the "four corners" rule. The court
went beyond the writing to ascertain whether, if such an agreement had
been made, it would "seem most natural that the inquirer should find it in
the contract." The court found that it would be natural to include the
obligation to remove the icehouse in the contract and therefore refused to
admit the oral agreement even though the court appeared to believe that
such an agreement did exist.-
It is instructive to consider what Professor Williston's "reasonable
man" approach to the parol evidence rule does for the proponent of an ex-
trinsic source of contract terms. It firmly adds the possibility of a finding
that the written agreement is not the only agreement between the par-
ties-but that is all it does. This is not meant to suggest that the
"reasonable man" approach is not a significant step in the evolution of the
parol evidence rule. To the contrary, Professor Williston's approach
makes it possible to convert a facially complete written contract, which
would have been treated as the sole and exclusive source of the agreement
of the parties under the "four corners" approach, into a written contract
which is not the sole and exclusive source of the terms of the agreement.
The first step in convincing a trial judge to admit the offered evidence
is to demonstrate that the terms not found in the written contract were suf-
ficiently "collateral" so that reasonable men would not naturally have in-
cluded these terms in the writing. Once the judge determines that the
writing is not totally integrated under the "reasonable man" test, he still
must determine whether the offered evidence is admissible as a consistent
additional term. In order to qualify for admission into evidence, the of-
fered term must be both consistent with, and additional to, the terms
already found in the writing.
24. 247 N.Y. at 348, 160 N.E. at 647.
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The majority of the opinions which reached this stage of the inquiry
concentrated on the question of consistency,2" rather than whether the
term was additional to those found in the written contract. 26 Those opin-
ions were uniformly restrictive in the standard they established for find-
ing the offered parol evidence consistent with the terms of the written
contract. For example, in the Mitchil127 case mentioned previously, the
court suggested that the buyer was attempting to introduce an inconsistent
term in offering to prove that the seller had agreed to remove the icehouse
as part of the consideration for the sale of the real property, even though
the contract did not expressly state that the icehouse was to remain. Why,
then, was the offered evidence inconsistent with the written terms? The
answer is that an offered term may not contradict either an express or an
implied term of the contract. The contract listed the seller's obligations,
thereby permitting the court to infer that the listed obligations were all of
the seller's obligations. The offered term, by adding an additional obliga-
tion, contradicted the implication that there were no other obligations
beyond those contained in the written contract.
The Mitchill holding placed serious restrictions on the admissibility of
parol evidence by requiring that parol terms be consistent not only with ex-
press terms, but also with any implied terms the court may find in the writ-
ten contract.
Not all courts have extended the implied term analysis to this extreme.
In Masterson v. Sine, 28 the question was whether an option to reacquire
land sold to the defendant, which was expressed in absolute terms in the
written contract, could be shown to have been limited by an oral agree-
ment to be exercisable by the named optionee only. The court admitted
the oral agreement because it only conflicted with the legal presumption
that an option is ordinarily assignable if it contains no provisions pro-
hibiting assignment. This, however, was a legal implication drawn from
the contract's silence on restrictions on assignability. The court did not
believe that is was proper to draw the conclusion that the offered term was
inconsistent with the writing when the offered term was only inconsistent
with a term implied by law.
The Masterson court actually skirted the question of whether the
agreement making the option personal to the optionee was inconsistent
with the implied terms of the contract. The written contract did reserve an
"option" in the sellers of the land. If confronted with this situation, the
Mitchill court might well have concluded that it was not just a rule of law
which implied that the option was assignable, but rather a rule of contract
construction which implied that the option was unfettered. Any attempt
25. 4 S, WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 642 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1961).
26. See 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 583, 585 (rev. ed. 1960) for a treat-
ment of the "additional" requirement.
27. 247 N.Y. 347, 160 N.E. 646 (1928).
28. 68 Cal. 2d 222, 436 P.2d 561, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1965). 11
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to introduce oral terms restricting the transferability of the option would
have been inconsistent with the implication, to be drawn from the con-
tract's silence, that the option was unrestricted.
Even if the offered term is consistent with the written terms, the court
must also find that it is additional to the terms contained in the writing.
When is the term an additional one? Courts traditionally have looked to
the writing itself to see whether it dealt with the subject of the offered
term, or whether it was totally silent about the subject. If the writing dealt
with the subject matter, the judge was likely to exclude the offered term. 29
Professor Wigmore suggested that the issue of whether an offered term
was "additional" to the terms contained in the writing was the only sensible
standard for determining whether the written agreement was less than
fully integrated. He maintained that the consistency requirement only
clouded the true issue because no one would seek to offer additional terms
if those terms would have no effect on the obligations of the parties under
the written contract. If the offered terms were to have any effect at all,
they would have to vary, contradict, or be inconsistent with the written
terms in some way. Rather than engage in what he perceived to be a futile
inquiry about consistency, Professor Wigmore suggested that:
[T]he chief and most satisfactory index for the judge is found in
the circumstance whether or not the particular element of the
alleged extrinsic negotiation is dealt with at all in the writing. If it
is mentioned, covered, or dealt with in the writing, then presum-
ably the writing was meant to represent all of the transaction on
that element; if not, then probably the writing was not intended to
embody that element of the negotiation. This test is the one used
by most careful judges, and is in contrast with the looser and incor-
rect inquiry . . . whether the alleged extrinsic negotiation con-
tradicts the terms of the writing .... 30
The approaches of both Professors Williston and Wigmore increased
the probability that a party seeking to introduce contract terms not found
in the written contract would be successful in that effort. Neither ap-
proach, however, could guarantee success, even if there was no question
that the outside terms had been agreed to, and were initially intended by
both parties to survive the execution of the written contract. The party
who wished to avoid the impact of the term not found in the written con-
tract could prevent its admission if the offered term was one reasonable
parties would naturally have included in the writing, or if the offered term
either dealt with a subject considered in the written contract, or was incon-
sistent with an express or implied term of the written contract.
At this stage in its development, the parol evidence rule remained a
barrier to finding the true agreement of the parties because it tested the in-.
29. 4 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 640 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1961). See also
Caputo v. Continental Const. Corp., 340 Mass. 15, 162 N.E.2d 813 (1959).
30. 9J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2430 (1940).
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tent of the parties by objective criteria. Asking what reasonable men might
do did not necessarily explain what the parties had intended to do. It was
Professor Corbin who attempted to bypass the fiction of the reasonable
man in order to ascertain the true intent of the parties.
"C. Professor Corbin's Approach
A third pre-Code approach to the parol evidence rule was developed
and advanced by Professor Corbin3 l and later adopted by the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts. 3 2 Professor Corbin's formulation of the rule was not
radically different from earlier expressions of the rule:
When two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a
writing to which they have both assented as the complete and ac-
curate integration of that contract, evidence, whether parol or
otherwise, of antecedent understandings and negotiations will not
be admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the
writing.33
His suggested method of finding the parties' intent to create a totally or
partially integrated agreement, however, was a sharp departure from
earlier views. He was not interested in a fictional intent ascribed to the par-
ties that might or might not coincide with their actual intent. Professor
Williston's objective "reasonable man" standard was concerned with what
people normally would do. Professor Corbin was concerned with whether
the parties subjectively agreed to the writing as a final and either partial or
complete statement of their agreement.3 4 The difference between the two
approaches is immense.
United States v. Clementon Sewerage Authority3 5 illustrates the em-
phasis Professor Corbin's approach places on a judicial determination of
31. 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 573 (rev. ed. 1960).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 236, comment b, & 239
(1973). The Restatement draftsmen may have thought they were adopting the
Uniform Commercial Code approach, but the Restatement's approach seems
closest to that propounded by Professor Corbin. J. MURRAY, CONTRACTS § 107(2d rev. ed. 1974). Professor Corbin thought that the Uniform Commercial Code
was adopting his position. 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 583, n.94 (rev. ed. 1960).
As the text suggests, the Code's approach falls s6mewhere between the Williston
and Corbin approaches. See note 46 and accompanying text infra.
The Code position is not the same as the position taken by the Restatement(Second) of Contracts and Professor Corbin, but the dissimilarity is not apparent
from reading the text of the Code's parol evidence rule. This appears to have been
the cause of the confusion on this question. The Code's approach to the question
of total integration is found only in the comments to § 2-202. The court in Inter-
form Co. v. Mitchell, 575 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1978), failed to acknowledge the
relevant comment and concluded that the Code has adopted Professor Corbin's
approach.
33. 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 573 (rev. ed. 1960).
34. Id. § 582.
35. 365 F.2d 609 (3d Cir. 1966). See also Sylvania Elec. Prod., Inc. v.
United States, 458 F.2d 994 (Ct. Cl. 1972); Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arioto, 69 13
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the parties' actual intent. The Clementon Sewerage Authority was created
to construct a sewage system. The Authority contracted in writing with
Albert Wise, an engineer, for the preparation of preliminary studies and
final plans for the system. The parol evidence question raised in this case
was whether Wise had breached an oral agreement concerning the cost of
the project. The trial court adopted Professor Corbin's approach by exam-
ining the extrinsic evidence in order to ascertain the parties' intent to inte-
grate. The court phrased the issue as "whether the parties assented to the
writing as the complete integration of their agreement." 36 The lower court
found that the writing was not integrated, but rather was only part of an
agreement that also involved an oral agreement as to the project's cost.
The appellate court affirmed, holding that although it was "unusual" to
omit such an important term from a written contract as comprehensive as
the one before it, the record was convincing that the parties had done just
that. The impact of the Corbin approach on the result in this case is clear.
Had the court followed Professor Williston's "reasonable man" view, it
would have excluded the evidence of the alleged oral agreement because
reasonable men would not have excluded their agreement as to the final
cost from the written contract if they had wanted it to be a part of their
final contract.
The differences between the Corbin and Williston views are significant
only in terms of the approach taken and not in terms of the ultimate con-
clusion the trial judge would draw in any given case. Professor Williston's
overall approach does much to retain the preferred position of the written
contract in the eyes of the law. Although the written contract is not fully
insulated from the effect of prior oral or written agreements, it remains
protected to a significant degree. Professor Corbin's approach seems to
demote the written contract from its exalted position and to largely elimi-
nate the "rule of form" aspects of the parol evidence rule. A trial judge
following Professor Corbin's approach would test the admissibility of the
parol terms solely by the credibility of the party seeking to introduce the
term. But this does not mean that the offered terms are likely to be ad-
missible in any significant number of cases where they would not have been
admissible under Professor Williston's approach. To the contrary, Pro-
fessor Corbin warned several times that "flimsy and improbable" 37 evi-
dence should not be admitted, and that a party seeking to introduce addi-
tional oral terms will have a "heavy"3 8 burden in establishing them in the
face of a written contract.
Cal. 2d 525, 446 P.2d'185, 72 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1968); Martindell v. Lake Shore
Nat'l Bank, 15 Ill. 2d 272, 154 N.E.2d 683 (1958); Atlantic N. Airlines v.
Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 96 A.2d 652 (1953).
36. 365 F.2d at 614, quoting Atlantic N. Airlines v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J.
293, 304, 96 A.2d 652, 657-58 (1953).
37. 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§.582-583 (rev. ed. 1960).
38. Id. § 585.
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If the adoption of Professor Corbin's approach would not change the
result in any great number of cases, and if his approach avoids the use of
fictions about reasonable men or clauses "touching on" a subject, why
have judges continued to adhere to the earlier versions of the parol evi-
dence rule which are more likely to fail to discover the true intent of the
parties? The answer lies in the otherwise unmatchable advantage of the
more traditional approaches to the parol evidence rule. As Professor Mc-
Cormick, a supporter of the Willistonian approach to the parol evidence
rule, said fifty years ago:
[The parol evidence rule] enables the judge to head off the diffi-
culty at its source, not by professing to decide any question as to
the credibility of the asserted oral variation, but by professing to
exclude the evidence from the jury altogether because forbidden
by a mysterious legal ban.3 9
Although Professor Corbin sought to take this convenient excuse away
from the trial judges, the parol evidence rule remains a judicial trump
card, held ready by the trial judge as a convenient basis for excluding
suspect parol evidence from the jury's consideration.
III. THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE'S
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
Uniform Commercial Code section 2-202 contains the Code's parol
evidence rule. It provides:
Final Written Expression: Parol or Extrinsic Evidence
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of
the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing in-
tended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement with
respect to such terms as are included therein may not be contra-
dicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contempora-
neous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by
course of performance (Section 2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court
finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and
exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.
The Code drafters obviously intended to change a number of the fac-
tors involved in considering parol evidence questioas that arose under
pre-Code expressions of the rule. First, parol evidence is more narrowly
defined, at least more narrowly than some pre-Code opinions had defined
it. Under the Code, parol evidence includes only prior oral and written
agreements, and contemporaneous oral agreements. The Code makes the
types of evidence described in subsection (a) of section 2-202, such as usage
39. McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for Con-
trol of the Jury, 41 YALE L.J. 365, 369 (1932).
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of trade and course of dealing, admissible to supplement or explain a con-
tract even if a court finds that the agreement is totally integrated, and even
if the contract contains a merger clause.
40
Perhaps even more importantly, the drafting of the Code's parol
evidence rule has shifted the nature of the judge's inquiry. Under all
pre-Code approaches to the parol evidence rule, the judge's first task was
to examine the transaction to determine if the written contract was a total
integration. The phrasing of the parol evidence rule required this because
the statement of the rule began with language such as: "if the parties
intended the writing to be a final and complete statement.
41
In drafting the Code's parol evidence rule, the initial inquiry was
shifted to the question of partial integration. The Code begins by asking
whether the "writing [was] intended by the parties as a final expression of
their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein.
42
The question of total integration is theoretically made the judge's last
inquiry under the Code's rule. The last clause of section 2-202 asks whether
the writing was "intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the
terms of the agreement." 43 This change in the order of inquiry appears to
have been intended to change the judge's frame of reference from one
which assumes that total integration was the likely or normal intent, to one
which assumes that the starting point, or initial assumption, is that partial
integration is the norm. 44
These two changes have had a significant impact on courts which have
worked with the Code's parol evidence rule. The Code's stated desire to
allow usage of trade, course of performance and course of dealing to play a
larger role as sources of contract terms than they sometimes had in the
past, and the shift in any presumption from one of total integration to one
of partial integration, have combined to increase dramatically the likeli-
hood that extrinsic sources of contract terms will be admitted for consider-
40. A traditional "merger clause," stating that the written contract contains
all of the terms of the agreement, is not sufficient to exclude course "of dealing and
usage of trade. Their relevance must be "carefully negated." U.C.C. § 2-202,
comment 2. Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3, 10-11 (4th Cir.
1971); Heggblade-Marguleas-Tenneco, Inc. v. Sunshine Biscuit, Inc., 59 Cal.
App. 3d 948, 131 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1976); Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust
Co. v. Pemberton, 196 Pa. Super. Ct. 180, 173 A.2d 780 (1961); Modine Mfg.
Co. v. North East Independent School Dist., 503 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973).
41. For references to the varying methods of expressing the parol evidence
rule, see note 1 supra.
42. U.C.C. § 2-202,
43. U.C.C. § 2-202(b).
44. Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc. v. Securalloy Co., 312 F. Supp. 801 (D.
Conn. 1970); Broude, The Consumer and the ParolEvidence Rule: Section 2-202
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1970 DuKE L.j. 881, 902; Note, Sales-Parol
Evidence Under the U.C.C., 35 TENN. L. REV. 398 (1968).
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ation by the trier of fact. These changes support the conclusion that the
drafters of the Code intended to "liberalize" the parol evidence rule. 45
With the Code's presumption of partial integration and its intended
purpose of liberalizing the parol evidence rule established, the analysis
returns to the initial question in all parol evidence rule questions: what test
do courts now use to find total integration? This question remains the first
inquiry for two reasons. First, it is still the most commonly accepted ap-
proach to all parol evidence rule cases. Second, while section 2-202 may
make this the last question in that section, if the court's answer is that a
total integration was intended, earlier questions such as whether the
offered term is consistent with the written contract do not have to be
answered by the court. For this reason judges, to the extent they are asking
whether a written contract was intended to be fully integrated, continue to
make this the first question they ask. Judges operating under the parol evi-
dence rule do not always ask this question. Many opinions seem to adopt
the Code's presumption that a partial integration was the most that was in-
tended, and do not test the written contract for total integration.
While the Code does not prescribe a standard for determining whether
the parties intended to totally integrate their agreement, the Code com-
ments do provide clues as to what the drafters did not intend the test to be.
Comment 1(a) to section 2-202 expressly rejects any pre-Code assumption
of total finality merely because the writing appears final on some
matters. 46 It is difficult to be certain which pre-Code assumption this com-
ment is rejecting; it appears to be a rejection of those vestiges of the "four
comers" doctrine which survived until the Code's promulgation. In addi-
tion to suggesting what ought not to be an appropriate test, the comments
also suggest at least one possible test for total integration. Comment 3 to
section 2-202 provides:
Under paragraph (b) consistent additional terms, not reduced to
writing, may be proved unless the court finds that the writing was
intended by both parties as a complete and exclusive statement of
all the terms. If the additional terms are such that, if agreed upon,
they would certainly have been included in the document in the
view of the court, then evidence of their alleged making must be
kept from the trier of fact.
The "certainly" test of the last sentence of comment 3 is a variation of
Professor Williston's "reasonable man" test. The Uniform Commercial
Code thus offers a test for total integration which falls between those of-
fered by Professors Williston and Corbin. It is for this reason that their
approaches to the question of total integration are necessary background
45. Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc. v. Securalloy Co., 312 F. Supp. 801 (D.
Conn. 1970); Zwiersycki v. Owens, 499 P.2d 996 (Wyo. 1972).
46. U.C.C. § 2-202, comment 1(a) states: "This section definitely rejects...
[a]ny assumption that because a writing has been worked out which is final on
some matters, it is to be taken as including all the matters agreed upon .... "
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for a complete understanding of how the Code's parol evidence rule
operates.
The Code tests total integration by starting with a search for the true
intention of the parties. The trial judge is to look at all circumstances sur-
rounding the execution of the contract in an effort to determine whether
both parties intended the written contract to be their final and complete
agreement. 47 This is essentially an adoption of Professor Corbin's ap-
proach, but the inquiry does not end there. Even if the trial judge believes
that the written contract was not intended as a final and complete state-
ment of the agreement, extrinsic evidence may still be excluded under the
more mechanical approach suggested by Professor Williston. However,
the mechanical test is no longer one of "naturally," but rather is one of
"certainly." While Professor Williston's approach would allow the trial
judge to admit the extrinsic evidence if he believes that reasonable men
would "naturally" have made the extrinsic terms the subject of a separate
agreement, the Code would exclude the extrinsic terms only if reasonable
men would "certainly" have included the extrinsic terms in the writing if
they had intended to preserve those terms as part of their total agreement.
The "certainly" standard implies a narrower frame of human conduct and
increases the possibility that extrinsic evidence will be admitted.
Once the trial judge concludes that the written contract is not a final
and complete integration, the court next must determine whether the
agreement is partially integrated, so that only consistent additional terms
are admissible, or not integrated at all. If the court concludes that a
writing was not integrated at all, all evidence of prior or contemporaneous
agreements would be admissible and the jury would have to decide what
the actual agreement of the parties was. The kinds of writings that lead to
litigation about the parol evidence rule invariably appear sufficiently com-
plete and final to be either partially or fully integrated, and these are the
alternatives from which the court must ordinarily choose.
If the practical choice is between full and partial integration, and the
written contract is considered partially integrated, parol evidence is still
only admissible if it involves consistent additional terms. The Uniform
Commercial Code's parol evidence rule thus resembles earlier versions of
47. Sunbury Textile Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir.
1978); S. M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978);
Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 400 F. Supp. 273
(E.D. Wis. 1975); Port City Constr. Co. v. Henderson, 48 Ala. App. 639, 266 So.
2d 896 (1972); Shore Line Prop., Inc. v. Deer-O-Paints & Chem., Ltd., 24 Ariz.
App. 331, 538 P.2d 760 (1975); General Equip. Mfrs. v. Bible Press, Inc., 10
Mich. App. 676, 160 N.W.2d 370 (1968); McDown v. Wilson, 426 S.W.2d 112
(Mo. App. 1968); Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Brown, 547 P.2d 846 (Mont.
1976); Whirlpool Corp. v. Regis Leasing Corp., 29 App. Div. 2d 395, 288
N.Y.S.2d 337 (1968); Golden Gate Corp. v. Barrington College, 98 R.I. 35, 199
A.2d 586 (1964); Conner v. May, 444 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); Lamb
v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974).
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the rule in yet another way. The question of total integration is only the
first hurdle a proponent of parol evidence must clear. The second hurdle
to be encountered centers around whether the offered evidence involves
consistent additional terms.
The Uniform Commercial Code's parol evidence rule does not define
the phrase "consistent additional terms." Instead, the definition was left to
case law development. Its definition was seriously considered, apparently
for the first time, in the case of Hunt Foods & Industries, Inc. v. Doliner.48
That decision, although brief and somewhat confusing, has become the
centerpiece around which subsequent developments under the Code's
parol evidence rule have occurred. In Hunt Foods the plaintiff was a cor-
poration that wanted to buy the controlling stock of another corporation
owned by the defendant. The price was settled but the terms of the ac-
quisition were not. The prospective buyer began to worry about the trans-
action when the negotiations were temporarily recessed, and demanded
and received an option to buy the defendant's stock. The optionee later at-
tempted to exercise the option but the defendant refused to deliver the
stock, alleging that the optionee had orally promised that the option would
be exercised only if the defendant solicited an outside offer for his stock.
Defendant also claimed that the optionee had insisted that the option be
signed in an unconditional form under threat that the negotiations would
halt.
The court's opinion did not deal directly with the total integration
question. Instead, it seemed. to assume that the written contract was only
partially integrated-and thus merely a final statement of those terms con-
tained in it. The court appeared to be more interested in the issue of
whether the offered contemporaneous oral agreement involved a consis-
tent additional term which could be admitted to supplement the writing.
After holding that the oral agreement was "clearly additional" since it was
not set out in the writing, 49 the court defined "consistent" in the negative:
"To be inconsistent the term must contradict or negate a term of the
writing. A term or condition which has a lesser effect is provable. 5 0 The
court also found that the alleged oral agreement did not contradict or
negate the written terms of the option.
48. 26 App. Div. 2d 41, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1966). The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts offers no help at all in this area. Section 241 provides that an in-
tegrated agreement may not be contradicted. The comments then state that
whether a contradiction is present depends on whether the language is consistent
or inconsistent, but no attempt is made to define these terms and no illustrations
are given.
49. Subsequent cases do not discuss the "additional" requirement at all. In
this respect, the case law under the Code parallels the pre-Code situation where
the judicial emphasis was on consistency. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
50. Hunt Foods & Indus., Inc. v. Doliner, 26 App. Div. 2d 41, 43, 270
N.Y.S.2d 937, 940 (1966).
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Under the Hunt Foods holding, then, the parol evidence must directly
contradict or negate a term of the written agreement before "proof of its
existence" can be excluded. Anything short of a direct contradiction is in-
sufficient to make the parol evidence inconsistent with the express terms.
Furthermore, the inconsistency must be in relation to an express term of
the contract, not one implied in law when the agreement is silent, or even
one implied in fact from the balance of the contract.
By requiring that nothing short of a direct contradiction with an ex-
press term will lead to the exclusion of extrinsic evidence, the Hunt Foods
decision has gone far toward emasculating the parol evidence rule when
the written contract is only partially integrated. Many pre-Code cases had
required that the offered parol evidence be consistent not only with the ex-
press terms of the contract, but also with implied terms. 5' Hunt Foods'
equation of inconsistency with a direct contradiction is also far narrower
than pre-Code definitions which almost universally held that consistency
required that the offered terms neither affect nor vary the terms which
were found in the written contract.5 2
In defining what constitutes a consistent additional term, the Hunt
Foods decision creates some confusion by suggesting that even though the
parol evidence is found to be a consistent additional term, it must still pass
the "certainly" test found in the comments to section 2-202. The certainly
test is generally believed to be a test for total integration, or more accurate-
ly, whether the offered terms are sufficiently collateral to the written
agreement that they would not "certainly" belong in the writing. There
seems to be no harm in applying the certainly test twice, if that is what the
court was in fact suggesting should be done. If this is required, then the
parol evidence must be consistent and additional, and must also satisfy the
''certainly" test.
51. The cases are collected by both Williston and Corbin. Both agree that
terms implied by law should not be considered terms of the contract for purposes
of the parol evidence rule. Thus both objected to cases which held, for example,
that parol evidence of an agreed time of delivery was inconsistent with a written
contract which was silent about time of delivery because of the "reasonable time
for delivery" term supplied by law when a contract was silent with respect to that
term. 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 593 (rev. ed. 1960); 4 S. WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS § 640 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1961). Professor Williston, however, also be-
lieved that parol evidence should not be allowed to contradict an implied in fact
term of the contract, at least not the implication that the written terms seemed to
express the complete agreement of the parties on a particular transaction. 4 S.
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 639 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1961).
52. Seitz v. Brewers' Refrig. Mach. Co., 141 U.S. 510 (1891); Johnson v.
Johnson, 297 Ky. 268, 178 S.W.2d 983 (1944); Violette v. Rice, 173 Mass. 82, 53
N.E. 144 (1899); Thompson v. Libbey, 34 Minn. 374, 26 N.W. 1 (1885); Gianni
v. R. Russel & Co., 281 Pa. 320, 126 A. 791 (1924); Gladden v. Keistler, 141 S.C.
524, 140 S.E. 161 (1927); Van Doren Roofing & Cornice Co. v. Guardian Cas. &
Guar., 99 Wash. 68, 168 P. 1124 (1917); Bushnell v. Elkins, 34 Wyo. 495, 245 P.
304 (1926).
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The Hunt Foods opinion, after supplying a somewhat unique defini-
tion for "inconsistent," did the same thing for the word "certainly." The
court offered the following explanation of the last sentence of comment 3
to section 2-202 which contains the "certainly" requirement: "It is not
sufficient that the existence of the condition is implausible. It must be im-
possible.'53
The "impossibility" standard attempts to change the judge's inquiry
from one of form to one of credibility. The "certainly" test, as originally
expressed in the comment to the Code's parol evidence rule, seemed
designed to preserve to some degree the rule of form that the parol
evidence rule has always promoted. The trial judge is to exclude extrinsic
evidence if he believes that reasonable men would certainly have included
it in their written contract. This is not an inquiry into credibility-it is a
question of form and the behavior patterns of reasonable men. What these
parties intended becomes irrelevant if reasonable men would certainly
have acted otherwise. In phrasing the question in terms of impossibility,
the Hunt Foods holding arguably shifts the inquiry to one of pure
credibility. Is it impossible to believe the term was either agreed to or
meant to be retained? Only if the answer is yes is the offered parol evidence
to be excluded. If Hunt Foods were followed on this point, the parol
evidence rule would lose those vestiges of a rule of form it has retained and
would become a pure credibility testing device.
IV. POST-HUNT FOODS DEVELOPMENTS
One of the frustrating aspects of the parol evidence rule is that the
courts have applied it unevenly. While there has been no apparent prob-
lem in recognizing that a parol evidence question is present, the cases
cannot be easily pigeonholed in a consistent pattern. There is, however, a
reasonably uniform approach to parol evidence questions which can be
gleaned from the cases decided under the Code's parol evidence rule dur-
ing the post-Hunt Foods era. That approach focuses on whether the par-
ties intended to totally integrate their agreement, and on the presence of
consistent or inconsistent terms in the agreement.
When faced with a parol evidence question, most courts look first for
evidence of an intent by both parties to product a final written agreement.
Courts look to the writing itself, the negotiations which led up to the execu-
tion of the written contract, and any other relevant facts that might shed
light on the intentions of the parties. If this evidence convinces the trial
court that the writing was intended to be a final and exclusive statement of
the agreement, no parol evidence will be admitted for the purpose of pro-
viding contract terms. To this extent, then the true intentions of the par-
ties control whether parol evidence will be admitted and Professor
Corbin's view of the parol evidence rule seems to dominate.
53. Hunt Foods & Indus., Inc. v. Doliner, 26 App. Div. 2d 41, 43, 270
N.Y.S.2d 937, 940 (1966).
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The true intent of the parties, however, does not always control.
Vestiges of Professor Williston's "reasonable man" test remain under the
Uniform Commercial Code's parol evidence rule. Professor Williston, it
should be remembered, recommended that parol evidence be admitted
only if the offered evidence involved terms which were sufficiently distinct,
or collateral, from the basic subject matter of the written contract that
reasonable men might "naturally and normally" make these terms the sub-
ject of a separate parol agreement. It is only if the trial court concludes
that it is natural to have a separate parol agreement that the evidence will
be admitted. The evidence is excluded, even if the court believes the terms
existed and were intended to survive the execution of the written contract,
in order to protect the sanctity of the written contract.
The Uniform Commercial Code followed Professor Williston's ap-
proach in a limited way, substituting a "reasonable man would certainly
have included these terms in the written contract" approach for the
"naturally and normally would have made it part of a separate agreement"
approach. Most courts have caught the connection between Professor
Williston's recommended approach and the Code's variation on his theme.
The clearest expression of the Code's approach is found in Braund, Inc. v.
White:14
[T]he trial court must make the specific finding either that the
agreement was intended to be a complete and exclusive statement
of the terms of the contract, or that, as a matter of law, the addi-
tional terms asserted were such that, if they had been agreed upon,
they certainly would have been included in the documents of sale.
In the absence of either of these findings, the superior court must
admit evidence of consistent terms. 55
Two additional cases illustrate the courts' applications of the total in-
tegration test. Conner v. May 56 dealt with a sale of cattle under a written
agreement which provided for delivery three months after the contract's
execution. The buyer refused to accept delivery from the seller, alleging
that the seller had breached the agreement by feeding the cattle in a man-
ner substantially different from that agreed upon. Although the alleged
agreement for the manner of feeding was not included in the written
agreement, the court admitted the parol evidence of this contract term.
The appellate court held that it was for the trial court to decide if the
writing was intended to be the complete and final expression of the terms
of the parties' agreement. The trial court had done so, and its findings that
the parties had not intended the written contract to be the exclusive source
of their agreement was supported by the evidence. Both the buyer and
several disinterested witnesses had testified concerning the circumstances
leading up to the execution of the written contract. That testimony, and
54. 486 P.2d 50 (Alas. 1971).
55. Id. at 56.
56. 444 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
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the trial court's belief that the manner of feeding until delivery was impor-
tant to the buyer, helped convince the court that the oral agreement had
not been abandoned. An expert witness even testified that it was common
to leave part of the agreement verbal in contracts of this type. Finally, the
intent of the parties was not frustrated by the "certainly" test since it was,
in the appellate court's opinion, satisfied in this case. 57
Whirlpool Corp. v. Regis Leasing Corp.58 is illustrative of decisions
which, while attempting to ascertain the intent of the parties, reach an op-
posite conclusion on the "certainly" issue. In that case the defendant had
submitted a purchase order on its own form for some equipment. The
written contract provided that installment payments for the equipment
would "start from the date of receipt of the material and/or equipment."
The defendant offered to prove that there was an oral agreement that the
seller would supervise the installation of the equipment, inspect it, and
train the buyer's personnel to operate the equipment before payments
would begin. The court did not think the offered terms were consistent
with the written contract, but went on to state:
If perchance the oral proof could be found to be consistent
with the terms of the instrument within the meaning of
paragraph (b) of Section 2-202 of [the] Uniform Commercial
Code it would be objectionable in the light of the official Comment
of the drafters of the Code. They wrote that "If the additional
terms are such that, if agreed upon, they would certainly have
been included in the document in the view of the court, then
evidence of their alleged making must be kept from the trier of
fact."
It taxes credulity to believe that defendant having prepared
the writing with considerable precision would not have included
therein the all important provisions that plaintiff was to supervise
installation of the equipment, provide for training of personnel
and thereafter notify defendant that it had an operable plant.5 9
While the court did not believe the defendant, this part of the decision
did not turn on credibility. Instead, it focused on a rule of form:
reasonable men would certainly have included these terms in the written
57. The court stated:
From the testimony in this case it is manifest that the usual practice
in the area is to have an agreement as to the manner of feeding yearling
steers intended for future delivery, and that such agreements commonly
are oral and collateral to any writing between the parties. The record
supports the implied finding of the trial court "that the additional terms
covering feeding of the steers would not certainly have been included in
the writing by the parties. We hold that the court correctly admitted evi-
dence offered in proof of such additional terms.
Id. at 953. See also Luria Bros. & Co. v. Pielet Bros. Scrap Iron & Metal, Inc.,
600 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1979); Hull-Dobbs, Inc. v. Mallicoat, 57 Tenn. App. 100,
415 S.W.2d 344 (1966).
58. 29 App. Div. 2d 395, 288 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1968).
59. Id. at 398, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
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agreement. If the defendant did not act like a reasonable man, the parol
evidence was inadmissible even if the terms had been agreed to and were
intended to be operative by both parties when the agreement was signed.
As these opinions indicate, courts have not followed the Hunt Foods
suggestion that "certainly" should be converted from an objective test of
the form in which reasonable men would frame their agreement into a
pure credibility test. The Hunt Foods definition of "certainly," that the of-
fered term must be admitted unless the trial court concludes that it is im-
possible to believe that the term exists, has not been adopted by any other
court. In fact, the Whirlpool opinion discussed above was decided by the
same appellate court that decided Hunt Foods. It cites Hunt Foods, and
even quotes from Hunt Foods, but it does not repeat or adopt the Hunt
Foods definition of "certainly." Instead, it follows the rule of form function
suggested for the word "certainly" by the comments to section 2-202.60
The second element of the Code's approach to parol evidence ques-
tions during the post-Hunt Foods era is an analysis of whether the oral
agreement contains terms which are consistent or inconsistent with the
written agreement. The parol evidence rule has always required that the
offered terms be consistent with the written contract. Hunt Foods suggests
that parol evidence is inconsistent with the written terms only when the of-
fered terms directly contradict an express term of the written contract. If
Hunt Foods had done no more than suggest that the contradiction had to
be with an express term, rather than one implied in law or fact, the opin-
ion still would be of relative importance. However, by requiring a direct
negation of an express term before parol evidence can be considered in-
consistent with the written contract, the opinion became truly significant.
This part of the Hunt Foods opinion has been largely followed in subse-
quent cases, although the opinion has not always been cited as authority.
These cases generally require that the parol evidence directly contradict
an express term of the contract before it is excluded. In Whirlpool,61 for
example, the court would not admit evidence of an oral understanding
that installment payments were not to begin until the seller had perfomed
installation, inspection, and personnel training tasks. The parol evidence
contradicted the written terms of the contract, under the Hunt Foods
definition of consistent, which the court said had been stated with "preci-
sion": "To be inconsistent the term must contradict or negate a term of
the writing. A term or condition which has a lesser effect is provable.
62
The offered evidence was excluded because it directly contradicted a term
60. No case has been found adopting the Hunt Foods approach to the mean-
ing to be given to "certainly." One generous assessment of the situation is "it is a
fair observation that this decision . ..has not had many adherents [on this
point]." R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4.08[3] Supp. p. 4-138 to 139 (rev. ed. 1978).
61. 29 App. Div. 2d 395, 288 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1968).
62. Id. at 398, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
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of the written contract which provided that payments were to begin on the
date the equipment was received.
In Bunge Corp. v. Recker,63 the court refused to admit evidence of an
oral agreement that the defendant was to supply crops for a contract of
sale from his own fields because the offered evidence contradicted a clause
in the contract in which the defendant warranted that "the commodity
delivered... was grown within the boundry [sic] of the continental United
States."
Finally, in Recreatives, Inc. v. Travel- On Motorcycles Co. ,64 a party
was precluded from offering evidence that goods had been delivered under
a consignment arrangement when the contract resembled a contract for
sale. In finding the offered evidence inconsistent with the terms of the con-
tract, the court relied on Uniform Commercial Code section 2-326, which
requires that consignment arrangements be described in the writing in
order to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. The court reasoned that a failure to
put this term in the written contract created a contradiction with the sale
aspects of the contract for purposes of the parol evidence rule. In effect,
section 2-326(4) makes the consignment term inconsistent with the written
terms as a matter of law.
When the contract is silent about a particular term, the Hunt Foods
approach suggests that parol evidence is almost always consistent with the
written contract. Thus, in Thrifty Rent-A-Car Systems v. Chuck Ruwart
Chevrolet, Inc. 65 parol evidence about promised rebates on the sale price
was found to be consistent with the written contracts, even if the contracts
contained a sale price. The unexpressed reasoning was that evidence of the
rebate agreement did not directly contradict any express term of the
writing. At most, the offered evidence affected the price term, but it did so
only indirectly.
Another decision along these lines is Ace Supply, Inc. v. Rocky-
Mountain Machinery Co. ,66 where the parties had signed a contract for
the sale of a tractor. The seller offered to prove that the sale would be com-
pleted only if he was unable to sell the tractor elsewher6. In effect, he was
attempting to show that a sale which appeared unconditional was actually
conditional. The court admitted the evidence, but did not cite Hunt
Foods. The opinion, however, is consistent with Hunt Foods. The parol
evidence did not directly contradict the written contract because the
63. 519 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1975).
64. 29 N.C. App. 727, 225 S.E.2d 637 (1976). See also Jones & McKnight
Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Eskimo Pie Corp. v.
Whitelawn Dairies, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Deck House, Inc. v.
Scarborough, Sheffield & Gaston, Inc., 139 Ga. App. 173, 228 S.E.2d 142(1976); Spina v. Ferentino, 30 App. Div. 2d 1035, 294 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1968).
65. 500 P.2d 172 (Colo. App. 1972); Flamm v. Scherer, 40 Mich. App. 1,
198 N.W.2d 702 (1972).
66. 96 Idaho 183, 525 P.2d 965 (1974).
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written contract did not say the sale was unconditional. Ordinarily this
would be implied from the contract's failure to describe the condition, but
Hunt Foods requires more than this. There must be a direct contradiction,
not merely an implied one.
Numerous cases have found the parol evidence offered by a party to be
consistent with the written terms of the contract, often in situations where
traditional thinking about consistency would have led to a different con-
clusion. In MacGregor v. McReki Inc. ,67 the buyer of goods offered to in-
troduce parol evidence, in the form of an oral agreement, that there was a
firm delivery date of no later than the second week of December. This term
had not been met; the goods had not been delivered until the latter part of
January. The appellate court thought this evidence should have been ad-
mitted and found that it was not inconsistent with a written term which
provided "[w]e also understand that you are going to try to have an ap-
proximate December 1 shipping date." The court relied on the Hunt
Foods definition of inconsistent which had been followed in the Whirlpool
case. The Whirlpool decision was cited as authority for the narrow defini-
tion of inconsistent used by this court.
Another decision which follows the reasoning of the Hunt Foods case is
Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc. v. Securalloy Co. 68 In that opinion the
court concluded that an oral understanding that the seller would deliver
up to 500 gross tons, depending on his ability to obtain the materials, was
not inconsistent with a contract term describing the quantity as "500 Gross
Tons."
Still another decision which followed the Hunt Foods approach but
which did not cite that opinion is Ciunci v. Wella Corp. 69 In that case a
fashion model had signed an agreement waiving any claim for injuries she
might receive from a hair treatment. When the model's ear was injured by
the hair treatment, she sued for damages. The defendant relied on the
waiver agreement as a defense. When the model offered to testify that the
release was only intended to cover damage to her hair, the court concluded
that this evidence was admissible as a consistent additional term.
As these opinions demonstrate, the Hunt Foods requirement of a
direct negation of an express term has become the operative definition of
"inconsistent." This is especially true in those cases involving partially in-
tegrated contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code's parol evidence
rule. 70
67. 494 P.2d 1297 (Colo. App. 1971).
68. 312 F. Supp. 801 (D. Conn. 1970).
69. 26 App. Div. 2d 109, 271 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1966). See also Bunge Corp. v.
Miller, 381 F. Supp. 176 (W.D. Tenn. 1974).
70. When the Uniform Commercial Code's parol evidence rule does not
govern, the decisions adhere to the more traditional definition of consistent and
the offered parol evidence is excluded if it would contradict or vary the terms of
the contract. See, e.g., Zim v. Western Publishing Co., 573 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir.
1978); Mueller v. Hubbard Milling Co., 573 F.2d 1029 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 99
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V. MERGER CLAUSES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Any study of the parol evidence rule would be incomplete without
some consideration of merger clauses. Merger clauses are clauses inserted
in written contracts in an attempt to prevent the introduction of contract
terms from extrinsic sources. In a sense, a merger clause is a private parol
evidence rule, designed to prevent a party from -later seeking to add in any
way to the written contract. A merger clause could take the following
form: "THIS AGREEMENT SIGNED BY BOTH PARTIES AND SO
INITIALED BY BOTH PARTIES IN THE MARGIN OPPOSITE THIS
PARAGRAPH CONSTITUTES A FINAL WRITTEN EXPRESSION
OF ALL THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT AND IS A COMPLETE
AND EXCLUSIVE STATEMENT OF THOSE TERMS. '71
At one time there was unanimous agreement among the authorities
that merger clauses were totally effective. 72 A study of recent cases involv-
ing these clauses shows that this remains an accurate statement in most
situations, 73 but merger clauses nevertheless are not treated with the
S. Ct. 189 (1978); Sylvania Elec. Prod., Inc. v. United States, 458 F.2d 994 (Ct.
Cl. 1972).
There are a few Code cases which adhere to the traditional formula for con-
sistency, but the parol evidence question is usually not central to the decision.
See, e.g., Friendly Ford, Inc. v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 293 So. 2d 746 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Romines v. Wagstaff Motor Co., 120 Ga. App. 608, 171
S.E. 2d 752 (1969); Paymaster Oil Mill Co. v. Mitchell, 319 So. 2d 652 (Miss.
1975).
A line of cases rejecting the Hunt Foods formula for consistency is beginning
to emerge. See, e.g., Luria Bros. & Co. v. Pielet Bros. Scrap Iron & Metal, Inc.,
600 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1979); Southern Concrete Servs., Inc. v. Mableton Con-
tractors, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Ga. 1974), aff'd, 569 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.
1978); Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum & Assoc., Inc., 38 Md. App. 144, 152, 380
A.2d 618, 623 (1977) ("[W]e reject the narrow view of inconsistency espoused in
Hunt Foods .... Rather we believe 'inconsistency' as used in § 2-202(b) means the
absence of reasonable harmony in terms of the language and respective obliga-
tions of the parties.").
71. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-12 (1972). The litigated cases do not involve
separately signed merger clauses. The expectation would be that a separately
signed clause would carry greater weight. But see text accompanying notes 75-76
infra.
72. 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 578 (rev. ed. 1960); R. DUESENBERG & L.
KING, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 4.08[3] (rev. ed. 1978); 4 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 633, 643 (3d ed. W.
Jaeger 1961); Comment, The "Merger Clause" and the Parol Evidence Rule, 27
TEX. L. REV. 361, 362 (1949).
73. See, e.g., Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39
(D.S.C. 1974); Redfern Meats, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 134 Ga. App. 381, 215
S.E.2d 10 (1975); Avery v. Aladdin Prods. Div. Nat'l Serv. Indus., Inc., 128 Ga.
App. 266, 196 S.E.2d 357 (1973); Dave Markley Ford, Inc. v. Lair, 565 P.2d 671
(Okla. 1977); 80th Div. Veteran's Ass'n v. Johnson, 200 Pa. Super. Ct. 447, 159
A. 467 (1931); Santos v. Mid-Continent Refrig. Co., 469 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Civ.
App.), aff'd, 471 S.W.2d 568 (1971); Super-Cold Southwest Co. v. Elkins, 140
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reverence they once enjoyed. 74 While the vast majority of cases enforce
merger clauses, several have not. In a sense, the erosion which the parol
evidence rule has undergone under the Uniform Commercial Code is be-
ing paralleled, as yet to a significantly lesser degree, by an erosion of the
impact of merger clauses.
In Luther Williams, Jr., Inc. v. Johnson,75 a merger clause was con-
sidered to be only some evidence of the parties' intent to produce a fully in-
tegrated agreement, and it did not prevent the admission of oral evidence
of a condition precedent which was not contained in the written contract.
A similar result was reached in Zwierzycki v. Owens,76 where an oral pro-
mise to repair made by a seller was enforced even though the promise was
not repeated in the written contract which contained a merger clause. The
court found that the written contract was not a complete and final state-
ment of the agreement of the parties, even though a merger clause was pre-
sent in the written contract.
Merger clauses can be mere boilerplate added to a contract by one
party in an effort to protect that party from both false claims and genuine
ones based on oral promises that were actually made. A merger clause can
also be a fully negotiated term accepted by both parties at the time the
contract was signed, only to be later challenged by a dissatisfied party. Un-
fortunately, many courts seem just as willing to enforce the merger clause
in the first situation as in the second, often without articulating any
justification for doing so. These recent cases which have refused to accept
merger clauses as an absolute bar to the introduction of parol evidence of-
fer some hope that the situation in cases of the former type may be chang-
ing.
VI. CONCLUSION
The evolution of the parol evidence rule, both within and without the
Uniform Commercial Code, is certain to continue. The Uniform Commer-
cial Code's codification of the rule has succeeded, as its draftsmen ap-
parently intended it to, in accelerating that evolutionary process.
Tex. 48, 166 S.W.2d 97 (1942); Tracy v. Vinton Motors, Inc., 130 Vt. 512, 296
A.2d 269 (1972).
74. J. MURRAY, CONTRACTS § 106 (2d rev. ed. 1974) ("[A] merger clause
may not be conclusive by any means .... [I]f it is a printed provision on a form
document, its effect may be substantially diminished."). The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts suggests that boilerplate merger clauses will not be given effect.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 242, comment e (1973).
75. 229 A.2d 163 (D.C. 1967).
76. 499 P.2d 996 (Wyo. 1972). See also Matthews v. Drew Chem. Corp., 475
F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1973); Port City Constr. Co. v. Henderson, 48 Ala. App. 639,
266 So. 2d 896 (1972); Kupka v. Morey, 541 P.2d 740 (Alas. 1975); O'Neil v. In-
ternational Harvester Co., 575 P.2d 862 (Colo. App. 1978); Atlantic Chem. Co.
v. Hardin Bag Co., 49 Ga. App. 748, 176 S.E. 772 (1934); Whitney v. Halibut,
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The restrictive approaches of the earlier versions of the parol evidence
rule have generally given way, in cases decided under the Code, to a more
liberal attitude toward the admission of oral evidence when a written
agreement is present. This liberal attitude finds its expression in two essen-
tially new rules of interpretation under the Code's parol evidence rule. The
first is the presumption of partial, rather than total integretation. This
opens the door to the admission of consistent additional terms. The second
is the narrow definition of "inconsistent" originally established by Hunt
Foods and, at least thus far, largely followed in subsequent cases: oral
terms are only inconsistent, and thus barred by the parol evidence rule, if
they directly negate the express terms of the contract.
Little is to be gained by attempting to make a judgment about the
wisdom of a more liberal approach to the admission of parol evidence. The
argument has raged on for so long, with the authorities so evenly divided,
that one more opinion would make no difference. It is sufficient to
demonstrate that the Uniform Commercial Code, while not abandoning
the rule, has significantly restricted its impact.
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